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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of market-based approaches to protect the environment has 
deep roots in the economics literature, dating at least as far back as A.C. 
Pigou’s proposals to adopt pollution taxes.
1
  In the 1970s, economists 
began arguing that U.S. environmental protection goals could be 
achieved more efficiently if the so-called “command-and-control” 
regulatory programs (referred to here as traditional regulatory programs) 
that were the foundation of laws such as the Clean Air Act (CAA) and 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) were replaced or supplemented with 
reliance on markets.
2
  If, for example, regulated entity A could achieve 
pollution reductions more cheaply than regulated entity B, a system 
allowing B to pay A to reduce its pollution more than required so that B 
would not have to comply with its own emission limit would result in 
more efficient pollution reduction than traditional regulation would.  As 
long as A’s excess reduction exceeds B’s underperformance, at least the 
same amount of pollution is reduced as would occur under traditional 
regulation, but at a lower total.  Moreover, such an emissions trading 
system provides incentives for those capable of reducing pollution at low 
cost such as A to over-control because it is profitable for them to do so, 
as long as the revenue A receives from B is greater than the extra cost A 
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incurs in generating excess reductions.
3
  Property rights proponents 
provided additional support for a shift toward markets, claiming that 
laws creating property rights in natural resources or in efforts to protect 
them would align the interests of property owners with the goals of 
environmental protection laws, to the benefit of all.
4
 
The first calls for greater reliance on markets in environmental 
protection were met with skepticism by environmental public interest 
groups and some policymakers, who feared that participants could 
manipulate markets for private gain and mask noncompliance with 
regulatory obligations.
5
  Some even questioned the morality of creating 
tradable rights to pollute or otherwise damage the environment.
6
  
Gradually, however, opposition to environmental markets weakened, and 
groups like the Environmental Defense Fund became champions of using 
markets to achieve environmental protection goals efficiently.
7
 
The turning point came with the enactment of the 1990 CAA 
Amendments,
8
 whose acid deposition control title created a cap-and-
trade program for coal-burning electric utilities that emit sulfur dioxide 
and oxides of nitrogen.  Under that program, Congress doled out 
pollution “allowances” to regulated utilities, who were then free to meet 
their individual emission control obligations by reducing emissions to 
meet the cap, over-controlling and selling excess allowances to utilities 
unable or unwilling to meet their own obligations, or under-controlling 
and purchasing someone else’s “excess” allowances.
9
  There is broad 
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agreement that the acid deposition control program has worked well, 
achieving significant reductions in acid rain precursors at a lower cost 
than would have been possible without an emissions trading component, 




As a result of the program’s success, emissions trading has been built 
into other U.S. domestic environmental programs, as well as into 
international endeavors such as the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas 
emission control.
11
  Ironically, when Congress considered the adoption of 
climate change legislation in 2009, it was the liberal Democrats and their 
environmental NGO allies, who initially had opposed the use of market 
mechanisms in environmental law,
12
 who most strongly supported the 
adoption of a cap-and-trade program for domestic emitters of greenhouse 
gases.  Conservative Republicans adamantly opposed cap-and-trade, 
demonizing it by characterizing it as “cap-and-tax,” even though it had 
been Republican politicians (including President George H.W. Bush) and 
their economist advisors who were largely responsible for the adoption 
of the acid deposition control program’s cap-and-trade experiment.
13
 
Despite opposition from one corner or another since their 
incorporation into environmental law, the role of market-based 
mechanisms has increased in recent years.  Examples of permit or 
emission allowance trading regimes abound in U.S. environmental law, 
covering regulatory programs as diverse as renewable fuel production 
mandates, fuel additive reduction requirements, development of 
endangered species habitat, and intra-watershed pollution reduction.
14
  
                                                          
 10.  See Mark E. LeBel, Lack of Judicial CAIR: Chevron Deference and Market-Based 
Environmental Regulations, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 286–87 (2013) (“The Acid Rain Trading 
Program has largely been considered a success.”). 
 11.  See generally Toni Johnson, The Debate over Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/debate-over-greenhouse-gas-cap—
trade/p14231.  Cf. Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 
AKRON L. REV. 1091, 1094, 1101 (2013) (discussing “a general trend of privatization” in 
environmental regulatory programs, including the dredge and fill permit program). 
 12.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See Thomas O. McGarity, EPA at Helm’s Deep: Surviving the Fourth Attack on 
Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 225 (2012–2013) (“As greenhouse gas 
legislation languished in the Senate, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several grass roots 
organizations funded by energy interests attacked the [2009] House Bill as ‘cap-and-tax’ 
legislation.”). 
 14.  Robert L. Glicksman & Thoko Kaime, A Comparative Analysis of Accountability 
Mechanisms for Ecosystem Services Markets in the United States and the European Union, 2 
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 259, 262–64 (2013). See also Royal C. Gardner & Jessica Fox, The Legal 
Status of Environmental Credit Stacking, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101, 104–21 (2013) (surveying 
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They also have appeared under other nations’ environmental programs, 
such as the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy.
15
  Some of 
these programs have worked well, while others have floundered, 
sometimes because robust markets have failed to develop and sometimes 
because participants have figured out ways to exploit the system, legally 
or illegally, in ways that undercut both efficiency and program 
effectiveness goals.
16
  The focus here is on the latter flaw, which has 
highlighted the need for the careful design of market-based programs to 
minimize opportunities for participants to exploit markets for financial 
gain at the expense of the broader public interest. 
This article assesses the use of market-based programs with a trading 
component as a mechanism for protecting ecosystem services, which 
have perhaps been less thoroughly explored than emissions trading in 
pollution control regimes.  It focuses by way of illustration on the use of 
markets to protect wetlands under the CWA’s dredge and fill permit 
program.
17
  Part II describes the concept of ecosystem services and the 
use of environmental markets to preserve them.  It also describes the 
CWA’s regulatory framework for mitigating the adverse environmental 
consequences of wetlands development.  Part III assesses the risks of 
relying on markets as environmental protection tools, providing several 
examples of abuses of such mechanisms that undermined the goals of the 
regulatory programs into which they were incorporated.  Part IV 
recommends that any market-based environmental program include five 
critical safeguards to ensure accountability and minimize opportunities 
for abuse by both market participants and regulatory overseers.  These 
include financial safeguards, verifiable performance standards, 
transparency and public participation safeguards, oversight mechanisms 
such as monitoring and inspections, and rule of law safeguards.  Part IV 
also briefly assesses whether the wetlands mitigation component of the 
dredge and fill permit program relies on these safeguards in ways likely 
to promote efficient wetlands protection while minimizing opportunities 
for abuse that have plagued other environmental trading programs.  It 
finds that the dredge and fill program has succeeded in incorporating 
effective accountability safeguards in some of these areas, but not others.  
                                                          
environmental regulatory markets under U.S. law). 
 15.  See, e.g., Glicksman & Kaime, supra note 14, at 264–66. 
 16.  See infra Part III. 
 17.  33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2011).  For discussion of the dredge and fill permit program, see 2 
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §§ 
19:15–19:25 (2d ed. 2007). 
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Part V briefly concludes. 
II.  ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, MARKETS, AND WETLANDS PRESERVATION 
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Recognition of the services that nature provides to humans is 
increasingly being used to justify environmental regulatory programs.
18
  
This Part introduces the concept of ecosystem services, describes how 
environmental markets may be used to protect these services, 
summarizes the CWA’s dredge and fill permit program, and describes 
how that program relies on wetlands mitigation requirements, which are 
often market-based, to protect the flow of ecological services provided 
by well-functioning wetlands. 
A. The Value of Ecosystem Services 
In recent years, the value of healthy natural systems to humans has 
been increasingly recognized.  These values are often referred to as 
“ecosystem services,” or the benefits that people obtain from natural 
ecosystems.
19
  The value of preserving the flow of ecosystem services 
can justify environmental protection laws, and the concept can be used to 
rebut the oft-stated
20
 but erroneous claim that environmental protection 
inevitably comes at the expense of economic development.
21
  To the 
extent that environmental laws preserve valuable ecosystem services, 
they enhance, not detract from economic value. 
Ecosystem services are often broken down into four categories: (1) 
supporting services, (2) provisioning services, (3) regulating services, 
                                                          
 18.  See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital: Reconceiving 
Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 460, 464 (2008) (“Better information on the 
economic and social value of ecosystem services, for example, can help efforts to use ecosystem 
services to justify existing or new environmental regulations.”). 
 19.  3 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
POLICY RESPONSES, at vii (Kanchan Chopra et al. eds., 2005), http://www.maweb.org/ 
documents/document.772.aspx.pdf.  See also Dale D. Goble, What Are Slugs Good For?  Ecosystem 
Services and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 411, 422–24 (2007) 
(explaining and listing examples of ecosystem services). 
 20.  See, e.g., Kevin Maurer, New Hanover officials worry pollution boundary could stymie 
development, STAR NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2011, http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20110430/ 
articles/110429601?p=2&tc=pg (detailing county officials’ concerns that environmental regulations 
will hurt the economy). 
 21.  See, e.g., Adam Babich, Can Preemption Protect Public Participation?, 61 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 1109, 1139 (2011) (reporting that “many scholars believe that, on balance, environmental 
protection is good for economic development”). 
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and (4) cultural services.
22
  As one scholar has noted, “[t]he concept 
behind ecosystem services is very simple—the environment offers 
critically important services for free that, if we had to pay for substitutes 
in markets, would command extremely high prices.  Government policies 
that recognize this basic fact, and that [aim] to ensure and provide 
services, could result in increased social welfare.”
23
 
B. Protecting Ecosystem Services through Markets 
Market-based programs in ecosystem services seek to protect the 
value of these services from harm caused by development or pollution by 
taking advantage of the operation of markets through commodification of 
those services.  These programs encourage people to think of 
conservation as a “private good” that benefits them, rather than as a 
“public good” requiring the support of governmental funding.
24
  They 
channel the benefits of environmental protection to landholders with 
control over the fate of the resources policymakers have decided are 
worth protecting. 
Payments for ecosystem services can occur through business-to-
business deals, the development of mitigation markets, the provision of 
government subsidies, or competitive grant programs.
25
  Landowners 
who agree not to develop resources which they control (and are 
otherwise allowed to develop free of legal constraint) receive 
development “credits,” which can then be sold to regulated property 
owners.
26
  The purchasers can use the credits to satisfy regulatory 
obligations that otherwise would have precluded them from developing 
their own land.  In short, “the value of the ecosystem products (services) 




                                                          
 22.  James Salzman, What Is the Emperor Wearing?  The Secret Lives of Ecosystem Services, 
28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (2011) [hereinafter Salzman, Emperor]. 
 23.  James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 870, 877 (2005). 
 24.  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Services & Natural Capital: Reconceiving 
Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 460, 475 (2008). 
 25.  Salzman, Emperor, supra note 22, at 602–03. 
 26.  See, e.g., id. at 599 (quoting Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture for the Bush 
administration, on the future use of credits).  
 27.  David Cooley & Lydia Olander, Stacking Ecosystem Services Payments: Risks and 
Solutions, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10150, 10151 (2012). 
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C. Protecting Wetlands to Preserve Ecosystem Services 
The value of healthy wetlands ecosystems was not appreciated until 
fairly recently.  Wetlands, which once were commonly referred to as 
swamps or bogs, used to be regarded as foul smelling and unhealthy 
breeding grounds for mosquitos, vermin, and disease.
28
  They were also 
regarded as obstacles to economically beneficial development.
29
  
Governments therefore made efforts to drain them, as quickly as 
possible.
30
  Both scientists and policymakers now realize that wetlands 
provide many valuable ecosystem services, including storm surge 
buffering, flood prevention, shoreline stabilization, soil retention, water 




Wetlands protection in the U.S. is driven largely by section 404 of 
the federal CWA, which created the dredge and fill permit program.
32
  
Section 404 prohibits the development through dredging or filling of 
privately owned wetlands without a permit from the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers (Corps).
33
  The Corps must administer the section 
404 permit program in accordance with guidelines developed by the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which also has the 
authority to veto individual section 404 permits.
34
  The Corps may not 
issue a permit if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed site that 
would have a less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, or if permit 
issuance would not be in the public interest, based on a balancing of 
                                                          
 28.  Gardner & Fox, supra note 14, at 105 (“Throughout most of this country’s history, 
wetlands were viewed as wastelands or nuisances.”); Thomas E. Dahl & Gregory J. Allord, 
Technical Aspects of Wetlands: History of Wetlands in the Conterminous United States, National 
Water Summary on Wetland Resources, United States Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 2425, 
available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/history.html.  
 29.  Dahl & Allord, supra note 28. 
 30.  See generally John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to 
Ecological Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787 (2008). 
 31.  J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and Federal Public Lands: Start-up Policy Questions and 
Research Needs, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 275, 275–76 (2010); see generally Thomas E. Dahl 
& Susan-Marie Stedman, Status and Trends of Wetlands in the Conterminous United States 2004 to 
2009, at 7 (2013), http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents/Status-and-Trends-of-Wetlands-in-the-
Conterminous-United-States-2004-to-2009.pdf.  On the carbon absorption role of wetlands, see 
Linwood Pendleton et al., Considering “Coastal Carbon” in Existing U.S. Federal Statutes and 
Policies (The Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions July 2012), 
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/oceans/bluecarbon/considering-coastal-carbon-in-existing-u.s.-
federal-statues-and-policies#.Up3q4tKmixo.  
 32.  33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. § 1344(c). 
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project benefits and detriments.
35
 
D. Mitigation Markets and the Dredge and Fill Permit Program 
The Corps must condition any permit it issues on the taking of 
appropriate and practicable steps to minimize adverse impacts on aquatic 
ecosystems.
36
  Some land developers provide their own mitigation on-
site, but the Corps allows section 404 permit holders to comply with their 
regulatory mitigation duties by participating in a form of emissions 
trading.  Private entrepreneurs have created “banks” of wetlands which 




As under other marketable permit and trading schemes, developers 
may meet their section 404 obligations by using the credits they purchase 
from such banks to compensate for (or offset) the wetlands they develop 
(and whose loss they do not otherwise mitigate).  The commodity being 
exchanged is essentially liability because the effect of the transaction is 
to shift legal responsibility for compliance with regulatory mitigation 
duties from the permit-holding developer to the mitigation banker.
38
  In 
addition, this market-based program, like others, may be capable of 
achieving wetlands protection more efficiently than a system that does 
not allow the purchase and sale of credits because the banker can take 




Developers need not purchase mitigation credits from for-profit 
wetlands banks.  They may instead meet compensatory mitigation 
requirements by purchasing credits from non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) or by paying into an “in lieu” fee trust fund used to protect 
existing wetlands or create new ones.
40
  It is not unusual for NGOs to 
                                                          
 35.  33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (2013); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2013). 
 36.  40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d).  See also Gardner & Fox, supra note 14, at 106 (describing the 
“avoidance-minimize-compensate” sequence under the dredge and fill permit program). 
 37.  Owley, supra note 11, at 1097–98; Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of 
Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland and Stream Compensatory Mitigation 
Markets, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 235–36 (2012). 
 38.  Womble & Doyle, supra note 37, at 249.  “From the permittee’s perspective, the benefit is 
certainty: fixed costs and no continuing legal responsibility.”  Gardner & Fox, supra note 14, at 107. 
 39.  See Owley, supra note 11, at 1110 (“Mitigation banks appear superior to individual 
projects because they are usually on larger parcels that are contiguous to other protected areas. . . .  
Mitigation banks enable consolidation of resources and planning and expertise. . . . Arguably, 
efficiency is increased with their use.”). 
 40.  Id. at 1098; see also Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
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participate in environmental markets by, for example, purchasing credits 
and retiring them from the system.
41
  Wetlands mitigation markets have 
thrived.  By 2009, several hundred wetlands mitigation banks were 
operating in the U.S., and wetland mitigation banking accounted for 
about a third of all regulatory mitigation conducted under the section 404 
program.
42




III.  THE RISKS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY MARKETS: THREE 
EXAMPLES OF MARKET ABUSES 
The collapse of the savings and loan industry and of mortgage 
markets has made policymakers all too well-acquainted with the dangers 
of markets, especially in newly created, intangible or unfamiliar goods.
44
  
The risk of manipulation and fraud is inherent in the operation of 
markets, and environmental regulatory markets are no exception.
45
  In 
various emissions trading markets, those who claimed to have produced 
and who then sold credits have been paid for making environmental 
improvements they would have made anyway (and even sometimes were 
already required to make), for “double-dipping” by making 
improvements for which they have already been fully paid at least once 
either in the same or another market, or for engaging in purely “paper 
trades” that are based on no real world environmental improvements at 
                                                          
No. 3:12–CV–00682–TBR, 2013 WL 4516774, at *17–19 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2013) (holding that 
the Corps complied with its regulations by requiring payment by section 404 permit holder to 
mitigation trust fund under in-lieu fee program); Lisa A. Wainger et al., Wetland Value Indicators 
for Scoring Mitigation Trades, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 413, 414 (2001) (“[L]and developers must 
either purchase credits from specific mitigation banks or pay into ‘in-lieu fee’ trust funds in order to 
receive permits to alter wetlands.”). 
 41.  See Jennifer P. Morgan, Note, Carbon Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: Risks and 
Opportunities for Investors, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 159 (2006) (“NGOs also have an 
interest in utilizing the emissions trading market; NGOs can buy emissions credits and retire them, 
so they can never be used to allow domestic pollution by another purchaser.”). 
 42.  J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman & Iris Goodman, Implementing the New Ecosystem Services 
Mandate of the Section 404 Compensatory Mitigation Program—A Catalyst for Advancing Science 
and Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 251, 254–55 (2009); see also Owley, supra note 11, at 1109 
(“Today, the majority of mitigation banks are private entrepreneurial ventures.”). 
 43.  Gardner & Fox, supra note 14, at 108. 
 44.  Cf. Victor B. Flatt, “Offsetting” Crisis?—Climate Change Cap-and-Trade Need Not 
Contribute to Another Financial Meltdown, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 619, 629–33 (2012) (comparing, but 
distinguishing the role of toxic assets in the financial crisis of 2009 and the potential for fraudulent 
manipulation of allowances under an emission trading program). 
 45.  See id. at 638 (arguing that the need to check fraud in emissions trading programs “is little 
different from preventing fraud in any market system”). 
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all (despite trumped up claims to the contrary).
46
  Although many of the 
most egregious examples of fraud have arisen under pollution control 
programs with market-based components, the risks are similar for 
ecosystem service markets such as the section 404 wetlands mitigation 
program. 
It is not hard to find illustrations of how profit motives induce 
cheating that impairs environmental regulatory markets in the absence of 
regulatory safeguards.  Three such examples are discussed here.  First, in 
an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on foreign oil, help grow the 
nation’s renewable energy industry, and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions that contribute to climate change, the Energy Policy Act of 
2005
47
 requires that transportation fuel sold in the U.S. be composed of 
at least a minimum volume of clean, renewable fuel.
48
  EPA regulations 
require petroleum refiners and importers (called “obligated parties”) to 
demonstrate compliance with individualized Renewable Volume 
Obligations (RVOs).
49
  Obligated parties may comply with their RVOs 
by purchasing credits from renewable fuel producers, but they may not 
generate a credit for a fuel that is not a renewable fuel, or create or 
transfer to any person an invalid credit.
50
  Credits that are not based on 
the production of renewable fuel are invalid.
51
 
EPA recently issued at least two dozen notices of violation to 
obligated parties alleged to have used invalid biomass-based diesel 
credits to comply with their RVOs.
52
  The credits were generated by a 
company that sold over 32 million credits, but that allegedly failed to 
produce even a single gallon of any renewable fuel.
53
  The company’s 
owner was charged with wire fraud, money laundering, and violating 
                                                          
 46.  See Womble & Doyle, supra note 37, at 291–92 (explaining that the lack of adequate 
regulatory oversight could allow mitigation providers to “double-dip”). 
 47.  Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).  
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2006); EPA, Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/ fuels/renewablefuels/index.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014, 10:00 PM). 
 49.  See generally EPA, Questions and Answers on Changes to the Renewable Fuel Standard 
Program (RFS2), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/compliancehelp/rfs2-aq.htm (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2014, 5:16 PM). 
 50.  40 C.F.R. § 80.1460 (2013). 
 51.  Id. § 80.1431(a)(1)(vi). 
 52.  EPA, Civil Enforcement of the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) Program, 
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/civil-enforcement-renewable-fuel-standard-program (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2014, 10:09 PM); see also Amanda Peterka, 2 Men Indicted in $37M Biodiesel Fraud 
Schemes, GOVERNORS’ BIOFUELS COALITION, http://www.governorsbiofuelscoalition.org/?p=8128 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014, 11:45 AM). 
 53.  EPA, supra note 52. 
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federal environmental laws.
54
  It is not clear whether similar, additional 
scams under the renewable fuel credit program have gone undetected. 
A second example of manipulation and fraud in environmental 
regulatory markets involves the intentional manufacture of a chemical 
(HFC-23) that is nearly 12,000 times more potent in its impact on 
climate change than carbon dioxide.
55
  The Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon credit trading program, 
values carbon credits according to the impact on global warming and the 
staying power in the atmosphere of particular greenhouse gases once 
they are emitted into the environment.
56
 
One greenhouse gas, HFC-23, is a chemical byproduct of 
manufacturing refrigerants and feedstocks for certain plastic products.
57
  
Between the initiation of the trading program and mid-2012, 46% of all 
credits were awarded to coolant factories, mostly in developing 
countries.
58
  Asian companies in particular produced HFC-23 so that they 
could destroy it to generate credits that could be sold under the CDM.  
These companies had no interest in manufacturing coolants, and 
intentionally went out of their way to use inefficient manufacturing 
processes to generate as much waste HFC-23 as they could.
59
  Evidence 
of their business model is reflected in the fact that they shut down each 
year as soon as they sold the maximum amount of HFC-23 credits 
allowed under the program.
60
  But the adverse effects of this scam went 
beyond the intentional manufacture of a useless by-product.  The 
companies produced so much coolant in their efforts to generate HFC-23 
credits that the price of coolants fell, which discouraged air-conditioning 
companies from developing more efficient and less environmentally 
                                                          
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output of 
a Harmful Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/asia/ 
incentive-to-slow-climate-change-drives-output-of-harmful-gases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
(describing the relative impact of HFC-23). 
 56.  See generally Michael Wara, The Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and 
Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2009) (explaining the Clean Development Mechanism). 
 57.  Political Thaw Raises Hopes for Refrigerant Regulations, NATURE NEWS BLOG (Apr. 26, 
2013, 9:13 GMT), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2013/04/political-thaw-raises-hopes-for-refrigerant-
regulations.html; Ryan Cooper, What the Heck is HFC-23?, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Aug. 9, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animala/2012_08/what_the_heck_is_hfc23039115. 
php. 
 58.  Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 55. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
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damaging alternatives to the coolant.
61
 
A third example of marketable permits gone wild arose under a 
California air pollution emission-trading program.
62
  To combat 
persistent smog problems in southern California, state regulators adopted 
Rule 1610, also known as the car-scrapping program.
63
  Rule 1610 
allowed emission trading between mobile and stationary sources, both of 
which emit ozone precursors that contributed to the region’s long-
standing noncompliance with the CAA’s national ambient air quality 
standards.
64
  Rule 1610 allowed factories to avoid installing expensive 
pollution control equipment by purchasing pollution credits generated by 
destroying old, high-polluting cars (and measured by the projected 
avoided emissions from the destroyed vehicles).
65
  The basic idea was 
the same one that provides the foundation for all environmental 
regulatory markets—the potential to control environmentally damaging 
activity at a lower cost than traditional source-by-source regulation is 
likely to achieve.  The trading program would induce the owners of high-
polluting, older vehicles to take them off the road, which is likely a 
cheaper way to reduce emissions than by requiring factories to curtail 
smokestack emissions through technological fixes.
66
 
The program was riddled with problems.  Many of the cars whose 
destruction generated emissions credits were already destined for 
destruction for reasons having nothing to do with efficient pollution 
control.
67
  In addition, some of those who generated and sold credits by 
allegedly taking old vehicles out of circulation crushed the bodies of the 
cars but sold the engines for reuse in other cars still on the roads.
68
  As a 
result, the factories that purchased credits could legally emit more than 
their individual emission caps would have allowed in the absence of 
trading, but without any corresponding reductions in ozone precursor 
emissions through permanent removal of high-polluting vehicles from 
                                                          
 61.  Id.; see also Wara, supra note 56, at 1783–87 (explaining the incentive to generate HFC-23 
credits). 
 62.  See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los 
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 235 (1999) 
(“The lessons learned from the Los Angeles pollution trading experiments should inform decision 
making in the development and reform of domestic and international emissions trading programs.”). 
 63.  Id. at 246. 
 64.  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006). 
 65.  Drury et al., supra note 62, at 246. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 261–62. 
 68.  Id. at 261. 
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the road.  Instead of achieving equivalent reductions at a lower cost, the 
trading program resulted in an increase in ozone precursor emissions.
69
 
In short, market-based mechanisms create financial incentives to 
trade non-existent credits that cost nothing to generate.  As Richard 
Toshiyuki Drury, legal director of Communities for a Better 
Environment (CBE), has explained, “trading programs create stronger 
incentives to manipulate the numbers and cheat, because credits that are 
fraudulently created are still worth money.”
70
  This dynamic means that 
market-based environmental protection programs will achieve their goals 
of efficient and effective environmental protection only if they are 
designed in such a way as to enable the government bodies that 
administer them to identify, halt, and punish those who profit from 
phony reductions or otherwise game the system. 
IV.  FIVE KEY ACCOUNTABILITY SAFEGUARDS 
Because markets in environmental amenities, like all markets, are 
subject to manipulation, market-based programs must be designed 
carefully.  If they are not, the potential to achieve environmental 
protection goals more efficiently than more traditional regulatory 
approaches may not be realized.  Further, the operation of poorly 
designed markets may subvert regulatory effectiveness.  The 
prerequisites to well-functioning markets of any kind include a stable 
political environment, well-defined private property rights, and adequate 
financial support for proper administration.  The absence of these 
background factors may induce a perception that a market is 
unpredictable and unreliable, which will impair trading and reduce its 
capacity to promote efficiency-inducing exchanges.
71
  An efficient and 
                                                          
 69.  Id. at 258–63; see also Nicklas A. Akers, New Tools for Environmental Justice: 
Articulating a Net Health Effects Challenge to Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 203 (2001) (arguing that emissions credit systems can actually yield negative net 
health effects).  For discussion of a car-scrapping program that achieved more mixed results, see Ted 
Gayer & Emily Parker, Cash for Clunkers: An Evaluation of the Car Allowance Rebate System, 
ECON. STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 13 (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/ 
files/papers/2013/10/cash%20for%20clunkers%20evaluation%20gayer/cash_for_clunkers_evaluatio
n_paper_gayer.pdf (concluding that the Obama Administration’s “cash for clunkers” program “led to 
a slight improvement in fuel economy and some reduction in carbon emissions” and that it “was not 
a cost-effective way to reduce emissions,” but that it was more cost effective than policies “such as 
the tax subsidy for electric vehicles or the tax credit for ethanol”). 
 70.  Drury et al., supra note 62, at 259; see also William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Anna T. Moritz, The 
Worst Case and the Worst Example: An Agenda for Any Young Lawyer Who Wants to Save the 
World from Climate Chaos, 17 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 295, 322–23 (2009). 
 71.  See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital: Reconceiving 
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effective market for protecting ecosystem services in connection with an 
environmental regulatory program, however, requires more to avoid 
exploitation that subverts regulatory goals.  At a minimum, 
environmental regulatory markets should include a series of institutional 
safeguards that include financial responsibility requirements, verifiable 
performance standards, transparency and public participation standards, 
regulatory oversight mechanisms, and rule of law safeguards.  The CWA 
section 404 wetlands mitigation trading program provides potentially 
effective versions of some, but not all of these accountability 
mechanisms. 
A. Financial Safeguards 
Traditional environmental regulatory programs often condition 
issuance of permits and other regulatory benefits on compliance with 
financial safeguards developed by agencies such as EPA.  For example, 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
72
 the federal 
statute that governs management of hazardous waste, requires evidence 
of financial responsibility (such as insurance) as a prerequisite to 
issuance of a permit to a facility that treats, stores, or disposes of 
hazardous waste.
73
  Similarly, regulations issued under the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),
74
 and by the multiple 
use agencies that grant permits to develop minerals on federal lands, 




Ecosystem services trading programs such as the CWA’s wetlands 
mitigation banking program should include similar financial 
responsibility protections.
76
  CWA wetlands banking rules do require the 
suppliers of credits to provide financial assurances such as performance 
                                                          
Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 460, 483 (2008); Carlo Giupponi et al., A Pilot 
Study on Payment for Ecological and Environmental Services in Lashihai Nature Reserve, China, in 
PAYMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 110, 114 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2009) (listing key factors 
affecting the effectiveness of payment for ecosystem services schemes). 
 72.  42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6922k (2006). 
 73.  Id. § 6924(a)(6); 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.140–264.151 (2013). 
 74.  30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2006); 30 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-800.70 (2013). 
 75.  E.g., 43 C.F.R. §§ 23.9, 3802.2 (2013). 
 76.  Cf. Victor Byers Flatt, This Little Piggy’s Waste Goes to Market: The Bold New World of 
Non-Point Source Nutrient Trading and a Proposal to Bring Home the ‘Real Reduction’ Bacon, at 
63–64 (May 24, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2269784 
[hereinafter Flatt, Bold New World] (discussing insurance mechanisms included in unenacted federal 
greenhouse gas mitigation legislation); Flatt, supra note 44, at 641–42 (same). 
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bonds, casualty insurance, letters of credit, or escrow accounts.
77
  
Mitigation bankers must maintain a ledger to account for all credit 
transactions, and must notify the Corps of Engineers every time a credit 
transaction occurs.
78
  One additional safeguard that may be advisable 
would be to require that funds to be used for mitigation be placed in 




B. Verifiable Performance Standards 
Most traditional U.S. environmental regulatory programs are built on 
a foundation of performance standards, which require regulated entities 
to achieve the level of pollution control or environmental protection 
needed to achieve regulatory goals, but afford those entities the 
discretion to choose how they will do so.
80
 A well-designed 
environmental market-based program should also incorporate standards 
against which to judge the performance of market participants, especially 
credit sellers.  The agency responsible for administering a trading 
program must not only promulgate general rules that establish the 
minimum conditions for trading that will achieve desired levels of 
environmental protection, but also determine whether individual 
proposed trades satisfy those requirements and will actually provide the 
promised environmental services. 
The tricky part is to strike a proper balance between creating a 
manageable set of rules and allowing for the smooth functioning of 
markets.  Detailed rules can reduce flexibility and hamper useful trades.  
                                                          
 77.  33 C.F.R. § 332.3(n)(2) (2013). 
 78.  Id. § 332.8(p)(1). 
 79.  Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.468B-1(c)(3) (2013) (defining qualified settlement fund established by 
defendants in tort claim for tax purposes, in part, as one whose “assets are otherwise segregated from 
other assets of the transferor (and related persons)”); John J. Gutricha & Fred J. Hitzhusen, Assessing 
the Substitutability of Mitigation Wetlands for Natural Sites: Estimating Restoration Lag Costs of 
Wetland Mitigation, 48 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 409, 422 (2004), available at http://ac.els-
cdn.com/S0921800904000151/1-s2.0-S0921800904000151-main.pdf?_tid=77e783e4-94c8-11e3-
afaf-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1392307627_70c1bc483e40d6e947d60c8a1c7495f6 (recommending 
requirement that wetlands development permittees post an interest accruing performance bond equal 
to the estimated foregone wetland benefits to provide incentives for more cost-effective wetlands 
restoration). 
 80.  See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 151–52 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (describing the difference 
between performance and design standards); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Goals, 
Instruments, and Environmental Policy Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 297, 305–08 (2000) 
(same). 
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In addition, extensive review of individual proposed trades will generate 
high transaction costs, blocking some beneficial trades that are too costly 
to arrange and implement.  But the absence of regulatory detail and 
meaningful review of individual trades creates opportunities for abuse.
81
 
The performance standards for wetlands mitigation trades under the 
section 404 program appear in Corps of Engineers regulations.
82
  Trading 
parties must prepare baseline inventories of historic and existing aquatic 
resources and identify immediate and long-term resource needs within 
watersheds that can be met through mitigation projects.
83
  In an effort to 
combat fraud, the regulations prohibit the same credits from being used 
to provide mitigation for more than one permitted activity.
84
  The 
regulations allow compensatory mitigation projects, where appropriate, 
to “be designed to holistically address requirements under multiple 
programs and authorities for the same activity.”
85
  It is not clear whether 
such “holistic” endeavors leave the program open to manipulation.  The 
Corps’s rules require identification of the parties responsible for 




Permit applicants must prepare a mitigation plan to ensure long-term 
protection of the compensatory mitigation project site.
87
  Each plan must 
include a description of the legal arrangements and instrument, including 
site ownership, that will be used to ensure long-term protection of the 
mitigation project site; an adaptive management plan to address 
unforeseen changes in site conditions or other components of the 
mitigation project; and other information needed to determine the 
appropriateness, feasibility, and practicability of the compensatory 
mitigation project.
88
  The plan also must include performance standards 
that can be assessed using the best available science so that regulators 
may determine whether compensatory mitigation is providing the desired 
and expected wetlands functions, and is attaining applicable metrics 
                                                          
 81.  See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of 
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 671–73 (2000) (discussing the pros and cons of both 
broad credit trade review and individual credit trade review). 
 82.  40 C.F.R. § 230 (2014).  
 83.  33 C.F.R. § 332.3(c)(2)(iv) (2013). 
 84.  Id. § 332.3(j)(1)(ii). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. § 332.3(l)(1). 
 87.  Id. § 332.4(c). 
 88.  Id. 
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(e.g., number of viable wetlands acres).
89
  These standards, which are 
supposed to be “objective and verifiable,” may be based on measures of 
functional capacity described in terms of hydrological or other aquatic 
resource characteristics, or comparisons to reference aquatic resources of 
similar type and landscape position.
90
 
The effectiveness of wetland mitigation efforts in general is far from 
clear.
91
  The dredge and fill permit program regulations allow restoration, 
establishment, enhancement, and preservation as mitigation strategies.
92
  
However, not all of these options may provide equivalent levels of 
ecosystem services protection.  According to some observers, 
“[r]estoration and enhancement projects have largely fared better than 
creation projects.”
93
  The National Research Council has recommended 
prioritizing restoration of existing degraded wetlands instead of creating 
new ones because restoration enhances chances for successful provision 
of ecosystem services.
94
  Therefore, any performance standards reflected 
                                                          
 89.  Id. § 332.5(a). 
 90.  Id. § 332.5(b). 
 91.  See David Moreno-Mateos et al., Structural and Functional Loss in Restored Wetland 
Ecosystems, 10 PLOS BIOLOGY e1001247, at 6 (Jan. 2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC3265451/pdf/pbio.1001247.pdf (“If markets for ecosystem services and mitigation 
offsets from restored or created wetlands are used to justify further wetland degradation, net loss of 
global wetland services will continue and likely accelerate . . . .”); Robert W. Adler, The Decline 
(and Possible) Renewal of Aspiration in the Clean Water Act, 88 WASH. L. REV. 759, 791 (2013) 
(“Restoring or replacing wetlands values and functions is no easy task, however, and the efficacy of 
compensatory mitigation has been questioned from a scientific perspective.”); Gardner & Fox, supra 
note 14, at 106 (“Study after study has revealed problems with compensatory mitigation.  Sometimes 
permittees simply ignored their obligation to provide wetland mitigation.”).  See also U.S. FISH AND 
WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 
2004 TO 2009, at 72 (2013), available at http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents/Status-and-
Trends-of-Wetlands-in-the-Conterminous-United-States-2004-to-2009.pdf (reporting that, 
notwithstanding some successful restoration projects, the net effect of wetlands mitigation creation 
and reestablishment efforts has been “loss of wetland diversity, hydrologic function, biological 
communities, and a ‘homogenization of wetland landscapes’”). 
 92.  See 40 C.F.R. § 230.92 (2013) (defining “compensatory mitigation” as “the restoration (re-
establishment or rehabilitation), establishment (creation), enhancement, and/or in certain 
circumstances preservation of aquatic resources for the purposes of offsetting unavoidable adverse 
impacts which remain after all appropriate and practicable avoidance and minimization has been 
achieved”).   
 93.  Owley, supra note 11, at 1096.  See also Martin W. Doyle & Todd Bendor, Evolving Law 
and Policy for Freshwater Ecosystem Service Markets, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
153, 159 (2011) (noting that “the ecological values of [offset compensatory mitigation sites] were 
also often extremely low”).  Professor Owley adds, however, that “restoration projects provide fewer 
acres and fewer functions than ecologists had predicted.”  Owley, supra note 11 at 1096. 
 94.  Andrea B. Smoktonowicz, Comment, Federal Conservation of Wetlands Runs Amuck with 
Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 177, 186 (2005) (citing MARK S. DENNISON, 
WETLAND MITIGATION: MITIGATION BANKING AND OTHER STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE 120 (1997)) (“Not only have restoration projects been more successful, but also their 
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in compensatory mitigation programs for wetlands development should 
reflect the relative chances of successful provision through available 
mitigation alternatives of the ecosystem services lost through 
development, based on the best available scientific knowledge.  In 
addition, to hedge the risk that restored wetlands provided through 
mitigation will not fully and effectively replace the services provided by 
wetlands destroyed or impaired through development, developers should 
be required to achieve levels of performance that reflect a margin of 
safety, such as a requirement that restored or created wetlands amount to 
some multiple of the wetlands for which development is approved.
95
 
C. Transparency and Participation Safeguards 
According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, “[i]nsufficient 
participation and transparency in planning and decision-making have 
been major barriers” to ecosystem protection, through market-based 
mechanisms and otherwise.
96
  Transparency is needed so that interested 
members of the public can gauge whether trades are consistent with 
regulatory goals and standards.
97
 
The dangers of lack of transparency are illustrated by a rapid rise in 
the price of credits for the manufacture or importation of gasoline 
blended with ethanol or other renewable fuels in 2013.  The market for 
these credits is connected to the renewable fuels standards adopted 
pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, discussed above.
98
  The price 
of ethanol credits jumped twenty-fold in 2013.
99
  Some attribute the steep 
                                                          
focus is on improving a degraded wetland as opposed to other methods, like creation or preservation, 
that do not focus on reestablishing an ecosystem.”). 
 95.  Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2006) (requirement in CAA that major stationary source to 
be constructed in area that has not yet attained the national ambient air quality standards more than 
offset its increased emissions with enforceable emissions reductions from other sources); Flatt, Bold 
New World, supra note 76, at 25 (proposing adoption of reserve ratio for nutrient trading to guard 
against natural disasters that prevent non-point sources of water pollution from generating promised 
credits for a point source). 
 96.  3 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 19, at 3. 
 97.  See Christie J. Kneteman, Building an Effective North American Emissions Trading 
System: Key Considerations and Canada’s Role, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 127, 127 (2010) 
(explaining that core attributes of an effective tradable market include transparency).  See also 
Gardner & Fox, supra note 14, at 142 (“Transparency is a critical feature for the credibility of any 
credit stacking program because it can contribute to public confidence that the markets are operating 
as they should and that the mitigation projects are providing appropriate offsets.”). 
 98.  See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
 99.  Gretchen Morgenson & Robert Gebeloff, Wall St. Exploits Ethanol Credits, and Prices 
Spike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/business/wall-st-exploits-
ethanol-credits-and-prices-spike.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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rise to hoarding of credits by big banks and other financial institutions 
precisely at the time when the petroleum industry needed them most 
because they were reaching the limit of the amounts of ethanol that could 




According to some observers, “[t]he market in ethanol credits is 
exactly the kind Wall Street loves: opaque, lightly regulated, and 
potentially very lucrative.”
101
  In particular, EPA refuses to disclose 
information on the identities of traders or the amounts they buy and sell, 
even though the agency itself does not engage in the kind of fraud 
prevention oversight that is characteristic of regulators of securities and 
other financial markets.
102
  It also does not require disclosure by market 
participants themselves, citing the need to protect the confidentiality of 
refiners and other market participants.
103
  The steep rise in the price of 
renewable fuels credits may result in corresponding increases in the price 
of gasoline to consumers.
104
 
One way to enhance transparency in wetlands development credits 
would be to create a publicly accessible registry that allows interested 
persons to track transactions.
105
  To remedy the absence of any 
centralized source of information on wetlands banking transactions, it 
may make sense to create a federal registry on environmental subsidies 
and trades, including wetlands mitigation transactions, and authorize 
citizen suits when required information is not submitted by participants 
or disclosed by the government.
106
  Other options include the creation of 
public boards with representatives of affected stakeholders to review and 
provide input on individual trades, citizens’ juries, community issue 




                                                          
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF WATERSHED PAYMENTS: AN EMERGING 
MARKETPLACE 53–54 (Tracy Stanton et al. eds., June 2010), available at http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_2438.pdf (discussing the creation of a registry as a potential 
infrastructure provider); Flatt, Bold New World, supra note 76, at 31–32 (discussing NutrientNet, an 
online system that enables nutrient trading programs to publish and obtain prices and facilitate public 
participation). 
 106.  John C. Dernbach, Citizen Suits and Sustainability, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 503, 525 (2004). 
 107.  MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, 
SYNTHESIS 99 (2005), available at http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf. 
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The Corps, with the assistance of EPA and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS), has developed an online tracking system, the Regulatory 
In Lieu Fee and Bank Information Tracking System (RIBITS).
108
  The 
Corps described RIBITS as a mechanism for providing 
better information on mitigation and conservation banking and in-
lieu fee programs across the country.  RIBITS allows users to 
access information on the types and numbers of mitigation and 
conservation bank and in-lieu fee program sites, associated 
documents, mitigation credit availability, service areas, as well [as] 
information on national and local policies and procedures that affect 




Early in the development of RIBITS, the Corps indicated its intent to 
integrate it with a global information system-enabled permit tracking 
data management system to further facilitate the tracking of spatial 
information associated with impacts and compensatory mitigation under 
the section 404 program.
110
  RIBITS is a restricted access site, 
however,
111
 limiting its value as a transparency device.  Portions of the 
site are encrypted, requiring a multi-step process that requires the 
downloading of special software to gain access.
112
  In addition, there 
appear to have been delays in updating the system to include the latest 




The agency supervising a regulatory program with a market-based 
component benefits from public participation, which can generate 
                                                          
 108.  See Welcome to RIBITS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://geo.usace.army.mil/ribits/ 
index.html.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Ruhl, Salzman & Goodman, supra note 42, at 262 n.51. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Welcome to RIBITS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://geo.usace.army.mil/ribits/ 
index.html.  See also RIBITS Background, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://www.bwsr.state 
.mn.us/wetlands/wetlandbanking/General_RIBITS_ Instructions.pdf.  A Corps Power Point 
presentation indicates that, as of May 2013, RIBITS was operational in 48 states.  See Steven Martin, 
RIBITS and Stream Mitigation, at slide 3, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS (May 23, 2013), 
http://aswm.org/pdf_lib/stream_webinar/ribits_stream_ martin.pdf.  For further background 
information on RIBITS, see Steven Martin & Robert Brumbaugh, Entering a New Era: What Will 
RIBITS Tell Us About Mitigation Banking?, 33 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 16 (May–June 
2011), http://elr.info/sites/default/files/martin.pdf.  For a video tour of RIBITS, see Becca Madsen, 
RIBITS Tour, VIMEO (2010), http://vimeo.com/11750345.  
 113.  See Letter from Randy Wilgis, President, National Mitigation Banking Association, to 
Steve Martin (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.mitigationbanking.org/pdfs/2013-02RIBITSletter.pdf 
(noting that several districts are not updating information on a timely basis).  
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information about the costs and benefits of both general trading rules and 
individual trades of which the agency may not be aware.
114
  Public input 
on current and prospective uses of proposed wetlands development and 
mitigation sites, for example, may be valuable, so that the comparative 
merits and opportunity costs of developing alternative sites may be 
assessed.
115




The wetlands banking program fares well in terms of some aspects of 
public participation but not others.  Compliance with the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) procedures for informal 
rulemaking
117
 should suffice to encourage and accommodate public input 
at the rules creation stage.  Opportunities to provide input on individual 
trades is not always as good, but the CWA wetlands mitigation 
regulations require that the Corps provide public notice of (and solicit 
public comment on) a proposed permit, including a statement describing 
the amount, type, and location of any proposed compensatory mitigation, 
or indicate an intention to use an approved mitigation bank or in-lieu fee 
program.
118
  The regulations also provide a process for other federal and 
state agencies with environmental expertise to provide comments on 
proposed trades, and the Corps has created a dispute resolution process to 
resolve disagreements between the Corps and other agencies such as 
EPA or the FWS.
119
  Nevertheless, the difficulty of locating permits and 
associated documents concerning mitigation responsibilities and 
performance may undercut the legitimating and information 




                                                          
 114.  See Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up Call: Lessons from BP’s Deepwater 
Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 59 n.345 (2011) (“Public participation and 
transparency are widely considered to be the backbone of legitimacy for public agencies.”).   
 115.  See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: 
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 361 (2013) (“To the extent 
one prefers that processes be open to all, and believes that deliberations among a range of 
stakeholders is likely to better inform decisionmakers, greater transparency . . . would facilitate more 
opportunities for the rich deliberation of many voices.”). 
 116.  See Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a Vision 
for Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 79 (2013) 
(“Broader, more informed, and more transparent public participation also increases the 
accountability of agencies and should instill a sense of legitimacy in the final rules that they adopt.”).  
 117.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (1981). 
 118.  33 C.F.R. § 332.4(b)(1) (2008). 
 119.  Id. § 332.8(e).   
 120.  See Owley, supra note 11, at 1122, 1126 (“It is not clear what a concerned citizen could do 
upon discovering a poorly operated mitigation bank.  There are no avenues for public oversight or 
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D. Regulatory Oversight Mechanisms (Monitoring and Inspections) 
Access to key information is a prerequisite to effective oversight by 
either the government or the public.  That access can take various forms, 
including mandatory monitoring, reporting, government inspections, and 
verification that the ecosystem services supposedly being provided 
actually are being provided.  Without accurate monitoring data, the 
integrity of the allowance market is compromised.
121
  The Corps’s 
section 404 regulations require each mitigation plan to contain 
monitoring requirements to help determine whether mitigation is on track 
to meet performance standards and whether mid-term adjustments 
through adaptive management are needed.
122
  Failure to submit required 
reports can trigger enforcement actions.
123
  Federal, tribal, state, and local 
resource agencies, and the public are entitled to copies of monitoring 
reports on request.
124
  The CWA regulations authorize the Corps to 




Whether these mechanisms work effectively in practice is another 
matter.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in 
2005 that the Corps’s guidelines for compliance inspections were vague 
on key issues such as how to determine whether mitigation is substantial 
and what information had to be included in reports.
126
  The GAO also 
found that, at least in districts it visited, the Corps performed limited 
oversight to determine the status of required compensatory mitigation, 
and it raised serious questions whether the Corps actually required permit 
holders to perform compensatory mitigation, required monitoring reports 
to be submitted, or conducted compliance inspections in accordance with 
                                                          
enforcement.”). 
 121.  Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, The Present, and Back to the 
Future, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701, 707–08 (2002) (“Unless there are adequate monitoring 
requirements [in environmental trading programs], it is difficult for the community or an 
enforcement agency to assess ongoing compliance and sue to enforce if necessary.”); Flatt, Bold 
New World, supra note 76, at 16–17 (characterizing water quality monitoring to be an essential but 
costly necessity of a nutrient trading program). 
 122.  33 C.F.R. §§ 332.4(c)(1), 332.6(a)(1) (2008). 
 123.  Id. § 332.6(c)(2). 
 124.  Id. § 332.6(c)(3). 
 125.  Id. § 332.6(a)(2). 
 126.  U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE AN 
EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IS OCCURRING, 
GAO-05-898, at 4 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-898. 
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regulatory schedules.
127
  Instead, the Corps largely relied on the good 
faith of permit holders to comply with compensatory mitigation 
requirements, rendering it frequently unable to assess whether 
compensatory mitigation had been performed.
128
  In some instances, the 
Corps did not even enter agreements with third-party sponsors to ensure 
the agency had legal recourse if compensatory mitigation was not being 
performed.
129
  The result was that some mitigation projects were 
unfinished and permit conditions were not met in some finished 
projects.
130
  According to a report by Resources for the Future, only 
about 20% of sites met the ecological equivalent of the displaced 
wetlands (using measures such as vegetative cover and hydrological 
function).
131
  As the GAO concluded, “[u]ntil the Corps takes its 
oversight responsibilities more seriously, it will not know if thousands of 
acres of compensatory mitigation have been performed and will be 
unable to ensure that the section 404 program is contributing to the 
national goal of no net loss of wetlands.”
132
 
It is not yet clear whether revisions to the joint EPA–Corps’s 
regulations adopted in 2008
133
 have adequately addressed these 
problems.
134
  At least one observer recently identified “[p]ervasive 
problems with monitoring, submitting reports, and performing long-term 
maintenance” by mitigation banks under the section 404 program.
135
  In 
the absence of adequate oversight, for example, “[t]here is a heavy 
reliance on good faith of [mitigation] bank operators.”
136
  In such 
circumstances, there is a risk that regulators forfeit to market participants 
such as mitigation bank operators an inappropriate policymaking role.
137
  
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 5. 
 128.  Id. at 27. 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. at 25. 
 131.  Margaret Walls & Anne Riddle, Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, and Land Use: 
Comparing Three Federal Policies 9–10, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-08.pdf. 
 132.  U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 126, at 27. 
 133.  Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19594-01 (Apr. 
10, 2008). 
 134.  See Adler, supra note 91, at 792 (“Although the new regulations include significantly 
stricter standards and procedures for compensatory mitigation, it is probably too early to evaluate 
how much better the new program will be in fulfilling CWA aspirations.” (citation omitted)). 
 135.  See Owley, supra note 11, at 1111 (noting the unavailability of monitoring reports, but 
citing sources that predate the 2008 regulations). 
 136.  Id. at 1112–13. 
 137.  Id. at 1113. See also id. at 1115–16 (claiming that land trusts holding conservation 
easements are unburdened by monitoring requirements or other forms of government oversight); id. 
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Notably, the EPA–Corps regulations appear to vest discretionary 
authority in the Corps’s district engineers to determine whether and when 
to conduct inspections to evaluate mitigation site performance.
138
 
Professor Lesley McAllister’s work has shown that other kinds of 
operational safeguard systems are possible, such as third-party 
verification, but the government must oversee the verification bodies to 
ensure the accuracy of their findings and reports.
139
  The value of 
government oversight, either of mitigation banks and other participants 
in trades or of third-party verification bodies, will depend on whether the 
agency has adequate resources to review reports submitted by entities 
such as mitigation banks and conduct periodic inspections of wetlands 
mitigation sites.
140
  EPA and the Corps admitted in adopting the 2008 
regulations that “[b]ecause of resource constraints, site visits cannot be 
conducted for each permit application.  Districts must prioritize their site 
visits to determine which sites require on-site evaluations.”
141
  Requiring 
                                                          
at 1125 (“Without consistent study and oversight, it is hard to know whether mitigation banks are 
delivering promised ecological benefits.”). 
 138.  See 40 C.F.R. § 230.96(a)(2) (2013) (“The district engineer may conduct site inspections on 
a regular basis (e.g., annually) during the monitoring period to evaluate mitigation site 
performance.” (emphasis added)).  See also Bonnie Malloy, Symbolic Gestures or Our Saving 
Grace: The Relevance of Compensatory Mitigation for Florida’s Wetlands in the Climate Change 
Era, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 103, 118 (2011) (“Heavy reliance on uncertain mitigation is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Corps has no mandatory duty to conduct inspections for compliance.  
Instead, compliance with mitigation requirements are specified in the permit conditions and the 
Corps generally relies on the permittee to provide reports—who often fail to comply.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 139.  See generally Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 1 (2012) (arguing for greater government reliance on private auditors to achieve regulatory 
objectives); Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40 
ENVTL. L. 1195 (2010) (recommending a cooperative regulatory enforcement scheme, which 
includes participation by third-parties).  See also Ruth Greenspan Bell, Culture and History Count: 
Choosing Environmental Tools to Fit Available Institutions and Experience, 38 IND. L. REV. 637, 
652 (2005) (describing the “daunting logistical challenge of monitoring, reporting, and verification 
against fraudulent record-keeping or phony reductions,” and arguing that “[t]he entire system 
collapses without a viable legal system or another institution to ensure the integrity of trades and to 
act in a timely manner to protect wronged parties”). 
 140.  Cf. Gardner & Fox, supra note 14, at 141–42 (highlighting the need to provide agencies 
with the resources needed to confirm the ecological validity of market transactions in wetlands 
preservation). 
 141.  Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19594-01, 19,609 
(Apr. 10, 2008).  Nevertheless, the agencies added that they “agree that vigorous enforcement and 
compliance activities are necessary for the success of the regulatory program, including 
compensatory mitigation.  The Corps believes that it has adequate resources in these areas.”  Id.  But 
see Royal C. Gardner, Rehabilitating Nature: A Comparative Review of Legal Mechanisms That 
Encourage Wetland Restoration Efforts, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 573, 596 (2003) (noting that “some 
governmental agencies may lack the necessary appropriations to conduct rigorous monitoring” of 
privately conducted wetlands restoration efforts). 
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bank sponsors seeking Corps approval to pay a fee may be a way to 
supplement government appropriations for these purposes.  Some states 
have imposed such fees to cover the costs to state agencies of reviewing 




The discovery of flaws in another ecosystem-based market program 
highlights the need for monitoring and inspections to verify performance.  
The approval by the FWS of a landowner’s habitat conservation plan can 
shield developers from enforcement of the Endangered Species Act’s 
prohibition on taking of listed species.
143
  In exchange for the FWS’s 
agreement to withdraw a proposal to list the sagebrush lizard as 
endangered, the state of Texas promised it would restrict surface 
disturbances in the lizard’s habitat through such a plan.
144
  In May 2013, 
the state reported to the FWS that no surface disturbances were 
occurring.
145
  In June, the FWS Director praised the state’s cooperation, 
indicating that the agreement was “the best outcome for the species.”
146
  
Only two months later, a report from the Defenders of Wildlife 
documented through satellite images and aircraft photos that many 
potentially disruptive disturbances had occurred in connection with oil 
and gas development, including a forty-meter wide clearing running for 
several miles, new roads, and new or expanded drill pads.
147
 
E. Rule of Law Safeguards 
Accountability for noncompliance with the law by everyone 
involved in ecosystem service markets—including market participants 
and government officials who administer the program—is critical if 
                                                          
 142.  See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1798.5(b) (West 2013); Conservation and Mitigation 
Banking, Laws and Policies, CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, http://www.dfg.ca.gov/habcon/ 
conplan/mitbank/cmb_genpolicies.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (chart describing fees required at 
each stage of the process of establishing a conservation or mitigation bank). 
 143.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1539(a)(2) (2012). 
 144.  See Phil Taylor, Texas Has Mismanaged Habitat Plan for Imperiled Lizard, E&E NEWS 
PM (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:52 PM), eandetv.com/eenewspm/2013/08/19/stories/1059986184 (detailing a 
report criticizing the state’s handling of the habitat plan). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Ya-Wei Li et al., Habitat Disturbances Under the Texas Habitat Conservation Plan for the 
Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE (2013), http://www.defenders.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications/dunes-sagebrush-lizard-mapping-report.pdf; Glaring Mismanagement Found in 
Administration of Texas Imperiled Species Conservation Plan by State Comptroller, DEFENDERS OF 
WILDLIFE (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.defenders.org/press-release/glaring-mismanagement-found-
administration-texas-imperiled-species-conservation-plan. 
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manipulation and activities that subvert the ability to achieve section 
404’s goals are to be avoided.  Judicial review provides one form of 
accountability.  An accountable trading program should provide access to 
the courts for the review of the establishment of ground rules for trades, 
and of individual transactions for compliance with those rules. 
Allowing citizen suits by environmental public interest groups or 
other stakeholders to enforce statutory and regulatory provisions such as 
monitoring and reporting obligations may be helpful.  These suits can 
take one of two forms: a suit against a private entity alleging regulatory 
violations, or a suit against a government agency alleging failure to 
perform a nondiscretionary duty.
148
  The courts are divided on whether 
citizen suits may be brought under the CWA concerning the dredge and 
fill permit provisions in both contexts.  Some courts have allowed citizen 
suits only against developers alleged to have discharged dredged or fill 
material into wetlands without a permit,
149
 but not against those alleged 
to have violated permit terms and conditions.
150
  The courts also disagree 
on whether the CWA waived the federal government’s sovereign 




Meaningful sanctions are also an essential component of an 
accountable ecosystems services regulatory market.  The creation of 
credible deterrents to minimize cheating in market-based trading 
programs is critical.
152
  These deterrents can result from authorizing the 
                                                          
 148.  On the latter, see generally Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen 
Suits to Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353 (2004) (outlining the history of 
citizen suits against the government for failure to perform nondiscretionary duties and discussing the 
costs and benefits of such suits). 
 149.  See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tidwell, 837 F. Supp. 1344, 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1992). 
 150.  See, e.g., Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. Chustz, 682 F.3d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1118–19 (D. Or. 
2000).  Cf. Owley, supra note 11, at 1118–20 (pointing to examples of marginalized public 
participation and questionable accountability in privatized regulatory regimes, including uncertainty 
over whether citizen suits may be brought under the CWA against private contractors, despite permit 
holders having absolved themselves of responsibility through the purchase of mitigation bank credits 
or conservation easements). 
 151.  Compare Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing 
suit); Golden Gate Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 717 F. Supp. 1417 (N.D. Cal. 
1988) (same), with Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 1996) (sovereign immunity barred suit).  Some courts that 
have concluded that suits may not be brought under the CWA have opined that suits under the APA 
may be available even if CWA citizen suits are not.  See Cascade Conservation League v. M.A. 
Segale, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 692, 696–97 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (dictum) (“[T]he APA provides an 
alternate means of obtaining judicial review.”). 
 152.  Cf. Flatt, Bold New World, supra note 76, at 20–21 (discussing importance of enforcement 
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imposition of financial penalties, the issuance of injunctions to shut 
down activities or require restoration, and the willingness to impose 
criminal sanctions for behavior such as willful misreporting.
153
  Simply 
having laws that authorize these sanctions is not enough, however.  The 
government must adequately finance investigation and enforcement 
initiatives and government officials must retain their independence from 
those who would profit from flouting the rules. 
An attractive option is to make a credit purchaser legally responsible 
for its seller’s failure to meet performance standards or comply with 
other program requirements, so that someone other than the government 
has a stake in successful ecosystem protection actions.
154
  The Corps can 
assess administrative penalties for violating wetlands protection 
regulations or permits, require forfeiture of bonds, suspend or revoke 
permits, and recommend the imposition of harsher sanctions by the 
Department of Justice.
155
  Whether the Corps actually uses these powers 
effectively is a separate question.  There is evidence that CWA 
enforcement actions brought by EPA and the states concerning pollutant 
discharges often fail to extract from violators the economic benefits of 
noncompliance.
156
  If Corps penalties suffer the same defect, slippage 
from regulatory requirements can be expected if it becomes more 
profitable to violate and pay penalties than it is to comply with regulatory 
obligations attached to trading authorizations. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Using markets to protect ecosystem services reflects both an 
increasingly popular methodology for structuring environmental policy 
and increased recognition of the importance of the natural environment 
                                                          
mechanisms for nutrient trading under the CWA). 
 153.  Imposing financial sanctions on mitigation banks that the Corps has terminated for 
inadequate performance may be problematic, however. 
 154.  Cf. Flatt, Bold New World, supra note 76, at 45–46 (discussing imposition of penalties on 
those in the business of producing nutrient trading credits for trades between point and nonpoint 
sources of water pollution); see also id. at 26 (noting that the Department of Agriculture regards 
transfer of regulatory liability from point to nonpoint sources of water pollution as beneficial 
because it reduces point sources’ fear of the risks of trading). 
 155.  See Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next Generation of Mitigation: 
Advancing Conservation Through Landscape-Level Mitigation Planning, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10023, 
10036 (Jan. 2010). 
 156.  See, e.g., Robert Glicksman & Aimee Simpson, No Profit in Pollution: A Comparison of 
Key Chesapeake Bay State Water Pollution Penalty Policies (Ctr. for Progressive Reform Briefing 
Paper No. 1305, Apr. 2013), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/No_Profit_ 
Pollution_1305.pdf. 
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in providing a valuable flow of social benefits.  The use of markets in 
ecosystem protection programs entails risks, however.  Scientific 
knowledge gaps may allow trading participants to engage in abuses that 
escape the attention of regulatory overseers.  The need for program 
elements that promote accountability—including financial safeguards, 
verifiable performance standards, transparency and public participation 
safeguards, oversight mechanisms such as monitoring and inspections, 
and rule of law safeguards—is therefore perhaps even more important 
than for other regulatory programs, such as some pollution control efforts 
that may be premised on better understandings of the causes and effects 
of environmental harms. 
The final word on the efficacy of section 404 trades in protecting the 
ecosystem services provided by wetlands has yet to be written.  The 
section 404 mitigation trading program has many of the elements of an 
accountable market device, but the agency’s supervision and 
enforcement of compensatory mitigation plans appear to need 
improvements if the kinds of abuses that have occurred in other 
environmental markets are to be avoided, and congressional cuts in 
funding for environmental programs may hamper the ability of both EPA 
and the Corps to create effective deterrents to actions that undercut the 
program’s protective goals. 
 
